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Introduction
One year ago, I reaffirmed the United States' commitment to water security,
to ensuring that people have the water they need, when and where they need
it, in a sustainable manner, while reducing the risk and impact of extreme
water events like droughts and floods. So water security for us is a matter
of economic security, human security, and national security, because we see
potential for increasing unrest, conflicts and instability over water. That is why
I asked the National Intelligence Council to prepare an intelligence estimate
on the national security implications of water security up to the year 2040. 1

As the above quote suggests, climate change poses a threat to stability, directly and
indirectly, from the individual level to the global level. Whether couched as military
security, national security, international security, or human security, adaptation to the
destabilizing effects of climate change has mostly presumed the availability of some
fully functioning, adequately prepared military presence for emergency response or
policing functions, especially from major world powers such as the United States.
Military resources and personnel, however, are directly at risk from the effects of
climate ~hange, and may be at such risk when they are needed the most. Military
preparedness is undermined by climate change in two particularly critical ways. First,
catastrophic weather events and sea-level rise pose a direct danger to military facilities, infrastructure, and personnel that are often concentrated on vulnerable coastlines. Secondly, the geographical changes brought about by climate change undermine
established boundaries on land and sea, triggering political tension, confrontations
over resources, and disruption of political alliances. By way of example for this second
type of threat, the current crisis over Arctic shipping routes and resources is examined
in this chapter. Although the threat to military resources and the Arctic crisis are the
focus of this chapter, the destabilizing effects of climate change on civil society are
briefly addressed in order to highlight the strategic importance of long-term planning
The author would like to thank Brendan Clegg, Alexa Roggenkamp, Jillian Jacobs, Derek
Mathis, and Candace Headen for their contributions to this chapter.
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to deal with the direct impacts of climate change on military preparedness, in addition
to dealing with the destabilization climate change threatens.

Identification of Risks
The very term "climate change" minimizes the severity and immediacy of the problem,
by suggesting a more gradual, long-term, generalized change in the climate. A more
accurate term, particularly in relation to this chapter's topic, would be "climate disruption." Many kinds of disruption in climate, whether gradual or episodic, or, for that
matter, beneficial at first look or ultimately detrimental, have some potential to threaten
political stability due to the disruption of everyday life as expected. Climate disruption
necessarily threatens human security, leading to instability and requiring a heightened
level of military preparedness. Climate disruption causes population displacement, relocation, and migration. 2 Episodic or gradual increases in water levels require measures to
protect the coasts,3 and retreat of land use from the coasts,4 as well as intensified levels
of domestic disaster p~eparedness and response,s or failing that, international preparedness and response. The effects of climate disruption on the energy sector in the United
States may jeopardize the country's ability to respond to disasters in other nations. 6
Domestic public health and disaster law frameworks do not adequately address the.full
impact of climate disruption within and outside the United States.?
A recurrent theme in the chapters addressing the above risks is the current inadequacy of the legal regimes to provide sufficiently for these episodic or more longterm consequences. In both contexts, ad hoc responses often hinge on the military
preparedness of the victim state or, failing that, the global community. Yet, very little attention has been paid to any coordinated efforts by the most powerful state
actors to prepare jointly for these contingencies. The international and domestic legal
framework for adaptation seems inadequate8 and underfinanced for the measures
provided. 9 The challenges the United States faces in terms of military preparedness, as
the most powerful military state in the world, are of strategic importance in confronting the challenges ahead. The increased demand for military preparedness and assistance from U.S. forces due to climate disruption comes at a time when those forces
may already be overextended, at home and abroad. The United States has not been
immune to the devastation caused by extreme weather events. Hurricane Katrina,
flooding along the Mississippi River, and wildfires in the western United States are
just a few illustrations of the tragedies that can occur as these extreme weather events
become m.)re prevalent. The diversion of critical military assets for domestic emergencies could inhibit other critical missions.lO
In addition to increased military engagement in domestic relief, armed conflicts
such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya necessarily impedes humanitarian calls
to action overseas. ll Many of the world's developing countries are located in areas of
the globe most susceptible to the effects of climate change-either low-lying coastal
areas, presenting storm surge and flooding vulnerabilities, or interior regions prol1e to
desertification and drought. Deployment of American troops for overseas humanitarian missions could "leave the United States short of troops and equipment precisely
when extreme weather events will be occurring more frequently at home." 12 Instability
caused by climate change in politically strategic areas of the world will create additional pressure on American military forces to respond to and assist fragile governments, even in the absence of humanitarian disasters,u These scenarios could quickly
worsen and create situations ripe for exploitation by extremists. 14
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Vulnerability of Military Facilities, Personnel, and Infrastructure
Alterations in the earth's climate will undoubtedly have a significant impact on military strategy, tactics, and planning during the 21st century. This impact will be most
noticeable as nations confront the variety of climate-based threats endangering the
physical and political stability of their military facilities worldwide. States have erected
traditional, defensive-oriented infrastructure designed to protect the borders of their
hOll}e front and repel foreign invaders. Powerful nations extended facilities outward
into distant territory, a move fueled by dual, coalescing purposes: (a) to provide an
extra layer of insulation and early warning against attack; and (b) to allow for quicker
offensive strike capabilities against far-flung enemies. In the post-World War II era,
with the advent of new technologies rendering the sea and air primary battlefronts in
modern warfare, military facilities have proliferated greatly on coastlines and island
outposts scattered throughout the oceans to advance these dual purposes.
These various coastline and island bases-which feature, alternatively, facilities
run by the Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps-face climate-related
dangers including rising sea levels, flooding, land loss through erosion, storm surges,
tidal waves, hurricanes, and any combination thereof. As predictions of the likely
effects of climate change become more dire, it is becoming apparent that the greatest
threats to these coastal and island stations during the 21st century might come not
from human enemies but from climate disasters and rising sea levels. In addition, the
impairment of these military posts could have important downstream consequences
on a nation's general preparedness for international conflict: the initial blow dealt by
natural disasters could leave some states extremely vulnerable to subsequent exploitation by predatory neighbors seizing any opportunity for conquest in a world with
rapidly shrinking stockpiles of resources, or by nons tate actors with disruptive political agendas or their own exploitative agendas.
Instability caused by climate change in politically strategic areas of the world will
create additional pressure on American military forces to respondY Escalating instability could present an opening for extremists to exploit the situation. 16 Under such
conditions, any response by the United States would have to be immediate.
Sea-level rise will undoubtedly have an impact on the security of low-lying American infrastructure. The Department of Defense,'s Quadrennial Defense Review Report
stated that, as of 2008, the "National Intelligence Council judged that more than 30
U.S. military installations were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea
levels."17 Naval bases in Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, C::tlifornia, are particularly
vulnerable to the effects of sea-level rise. Through the end of the 2000s, sea level is
expected to rise anywhere between 1.3 feet and 6.6 feet, but most likely around 2.6
feet. 18 Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard bases will also be affected by
climate change. Bases in every branch of the military have diminished, both in number and extent. 19 It is therefore necessary to ensure that the military installations that
remain are maintained at the highest standards of protection. 20
Just as domestic military installations will confront the challenges of climate disruption, American infrastructure will also be vulnerable to storm surges and sea-level
rise internationally. In fact, these overseas facilities may be at greater risk. Many of
the dangers faced by coastal facilities-whether on the home front or on strategically located island outposts-overlap considerably. The most prominent threat facing such facilities comes from the rise of existing sea levels. As discussed previously,
conservative estimates of the likely measurement of sea-level rise by the end of the
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century hover around 1.3 feet;21 more dire predictions lie at about 6.6 feet. 22 A rise
in sea level of the magnitude anticipated could put entire existing port facilities literally underwater. Military officials will face excruciating decisions, constrained by
tightening national budgets and geographic and political realities, to either abandon
existing facilities or attempt to move them inland in the many instances when fortificatipn against the sea is at best only a temporary solution; as the distances from the
coast lengthen, the costs of such a monumental move will inevitably skyrocket. As
the United States military, and the Navy in particular, prepare for climate change, the
construction of new bases to replace those susceptible to sea-level rise and extreme
weather events has been considered. 23 Navy leadership is not only contemplating the
addition of traditional naval bases, but also offshore "sea basing" platforms,24 These
sea bases could provide economically efficient and politically neutral alternatives to
more traditional bases that require heavy investment and host country consent. 25
Some military infrastructure, especially naval docks and piers, simply cannot be
moved and replaced on firm ground until a constant coastline has solidified. The cost
implications for major continental, low-lying naval hubs, such as those mentioned
previously in Norfolk, Virginia, or San Diego, California, could be staggering, due to
the sheer number and size of the structures immediately adjacent to the coast. 26
Commanders of bases situated on island outposts face a similar quandary as those
stationed on the continents: which facilities should be saved, which can be moved,
and which must be abandoned out of logistical or financial necessity? Some islands,
however, face an even more pressing possibility from rising sea levels: annihilation
from the map. Military officials have already highlighted Diego Garcia, an island atoll
in the Indian Ocean, as a likely candidate for near or complete disappearance due to
rising sea levelsP Diego Garcia, which sits perilously on an outcrop only a few feet
above sea level, serves as a logistics hub for both American and British military outfits
in the Middle East; it plays an important role in continued operations against coalition enemies in the war on terror. As sea levels rise, the island hub may be drowned
completely, forcing those stationed at Diego Garcia to search for a substitute location
that will almost certainly lack the combination of proximity and security that Diego
Garcia possesses. Low-lying Pacific islands, including Guam, could face similar issues
and require a comparable plan for substitution. 28
The slow trudge of the rising sea toward the eventual drowning out of some
coastal facilities is accompanied by two concomitant threats stemming from these
higher ocean levels: flooding and land loss through erosion. 29 While a steady increase
in rising sea levels can be dealt with through advance planning and erecting coastal
barriers or reconstructing facilities at sufficient distances from low-lying coasts, sudden or sustained floods could knock out vital infrastructure before a backup plan has
been implemented. Some of the "most vulnerable regions in the world to sea level rise"
are located in Asia, especially those nations on both the subcontinent and in Southeast
Asia, including India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. 30 The persistent
presence of ocean water, even if not permanent, can contribute slowly to land erosion. 31 This slow elimination of land through erosion, when combined with the steady
sea-level rise, will hasten the need to move military installations inland in an effort
to avoid being swallowed by the sea. Inland flooding can also result from a marked
increase in storm surges, with the same disastrous effects as those caused by flooding
from sea-level rise. In combination with a higher average sea level, future storm surges
could "enable inundation and damaging waves to penetrate further inland, increasing
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flooding, erosion, and the subsequent detrimental impacts on built infrastructure and
natural ecosystems."32 Lind along rivers that are connected to the oceans is also at risk
of loss because increased sea level could also mean increased river levels. This landlike that along the Niger, Mekong, Yangtze, Ganges, Nile, Rhine, and Mississippi rivers-is often characterized by high population densities and economic development. 33
A single storm that causes significant flooding of these lands could have devastating
effects on the directly affected areas in addition to other regions that depend on them.
As global temperatures rise, so too will the risk of wildfires. 34 These fires pose
serious threats to military installations throughout the interior of the United States.
This danger also extends to military training facilities that are usually found in arid
parts of the country meant to mimic potential combat zones.
At present, the correlation between rising temperatures and the increased quantity, and intensity, of various kinds of storms is still subject to spirited debate. 35 These
include storm surges, hurricanes, cyclones, tornadoes, and other tropical storms. The
combination of such storms with the rising of sea levels, which is more conclusively
presumed as inevitable, is dire; moreover, the intertwined effect of more intense storms
and higher water levels would wreak havoc on coastal facilities worldwide. 36 The
National Resource Council observed that "[s]torm surges occurring on higher mean
sea levels will enable inundation and damaging waves to penetrate further inland,
increasing flooding, erosion, and the subsequent detrimental impacts on built infrastructure."37 In recent years, the catastrophic impact of such violent storms is readily
evident: Hurricane Andrew in 2002 ravaged an air force base in Florida that was
never reopened; Hurricane Ivan in 2004 knocked a naval air station, also in Florida,
out of commission for an entire year. 38 Although not directly affecting major U.S.
military facilities, the widespread destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina on the
entire city of New Orleans is well-documented. 39 Coastlines are ~home to approximately two-thirds of the world's population. 40 Changes in sea level will necessitate
humanitarian assistance. The limits of the United States' resources along with the
political importance of stability will force difficult decisions about when and to what
extent the country will respond to those calls, in terms of resource allocation, strategic
importance, and nonclimate disruption demands on the military.
The management and coordination of modern war depends on far more than
the decisions made by military brass at the command centers, operations hubs, and
military installations discussed above. The seamless functioning of the leadership hierarchy at these bases often depends on a whole host of elements similarly running
smoothly. Dubbed "critically important facilities and infrastructure" by nonprofit
research institute CNA Corporation (CNA), these elements include routes and methods of transportation, heavy industry and production centers, port and docking facilities, and energy production and distribution stations. 41 For example, CNA observed
that the Department of Defense is "almost completely dependent on electricity from
the national grid to power critical missions at fixed installations."42 Like military
installations, the "critically important facilities and infrastructure" are often near the
coast; they are also subject to rising sea levels, storm surges, flooding, and extreme
weather events capable of either slowly drowning them out or destroying them in
a single strike. Destruction of this support infrastructure could effectively cripple
an entire base while leaving it physically untouched; in today's world, such a facility could hardly function without available transportation routes, sustained power,
Internet access, and constant provision of essential supplies. Therefore, the complex
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decisions regarding which facilities to move-and how to implement such a plan-are
only made more intricate when injected with considerations relating to essential auxiliary infrastructure. 43 The estimated costs of preparing these structures for the potential effects of climate change are steep and wide-ranging-somewhere between $5
billion and $295 billion per year for five years. 44 While these numbers seem daunting,
all the potential damages caused by severe weather events could add up to much more.
In the end, climate proofing may be the more cost-effective alternative. There are
immediate operational costs as well. Currently, to insulate military assets from storm
damage, aircraft are moved inward and ships leave port as hurricanes approach. 45
This movement increases operational costs for military installations, particularly on
the eastern seaboard. Moreover, this migration inhibits military readiness for disaster
response and other future missions.
A foretaste of the devastation that can befall a nation from extreme weather conditions is the catastrophe that hit Japan in March 2011. An earthquake that triggered a
subsequent tsunami ravaged the Japanese archipelago, causing immeasurable physical,
economic, and emotional damage. The previously unimaginable combination of a 9.0
earthquake and tsunami precipitated the worst nuclear emergency since Chernobyl at
the Fukushima Daiichi power station. 46 An overheated nuclear reactor core, unable to
cool due to the loss of power to backup cooling systems, threatened to expose the island
nation and possibly more distant locations to large amounts of radiationY
As witnessed in Japan, the human security risks present from a nuclear meltdown
are staggering; large-scale nuclear disaster caused by climate catastrophes (however
unlikely) could threaten entire regions of the United States and call for long-term, or
even permanent, evacuation of contaminated areas. Proximity of nuclear facilities to
other military installations would, of course, present an additional risk to those facilities that also stems directly from the consequences of climate disaster. Approximately
two dozen nuclear facilities and refineries are situated near the American coastline
and are at risk of severe storm damage. 48
As with all events that have implications for the military, an examination of the
immediate effects is too narrow a lens with which to evaluate the range of potential
consequences. Any military resources funneled into efforts to prevent, adapt to, or
recover from the calamities of climate change are necessarily diverted from other
. pressing military obligations. The downstream effects of preparing for the ramifications of climate change are therefore readily apparent: forces that are sent to rebuild
damaged infrastructure cannot be quickly deployed anywhere else, and troops and
equipment removed from vulnerable positions are out of position and likely incapable
of rapid mobilization. The problems posed by climate disaster as related to martial
preparedness are therefore twofold: military units can be thousands of miles away,
occupied by complex international relief efforts; or they can simply be removed from
their home dock or airfield, and unable to respond immediately to rapid attacks. 49
A more searching inquiry into the first problem reveals· several issues beyond the
practical difficulties of stationing troops far overseas. While on recovery missions in
foreign lands recently devastated by a climate catastrophe, troops are left vulnerable
to residual weather conditions. More importantly, they may be placed in hostile environments teeming with disrupted local populations, who are cast into desperate situations following a sudden upheaval and seeking to establish-or re-establish-their
power base. As discussed above, some of these locations are likely hotbeds for radicalism and terrorism. 50 Parallels may be drawn to the outbreaks of terrorist activity
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conducted by radical extremists after American military missions began in Iraq and
Afghanistan during the first decade of the 2000S. 51
The second problem related to military readiness posed by climate disaster is more
straightforward: without equipment and troops standing at the ready, operating the stations on the home front, countries will be vulnerable to well-timed, opportunistic attacks
by their enemies. The evacuation of necessary personnel from coastal regions, in anticipation of impending storms or floods, leaves these areas exposed. It is easy to envision the
effects of attacks directed at unprotected facilities and installations that lack the person~el to operate coastal defenses or anti-aircraft batteries. As can be seen from these two
scenarios, the prospect of monumental, violent storms-both abroad and at homedrastically reduces the ability of military forces to respond to threats and positions them
in vulnerable situations in an increasingly destabilizing international environment. These
problems are only amplified if forward bases-such as those on mid-ocean islands-are
lost, greatly reducing the ability of the military to respond to crises in vital areas.
In addition to the potential effects of inundation on military installations, climate
change will affect military readiness in other ways. Severe weather could make ship
and aircraft operations more difficult, creating a distraction from the main mission. 52
Catastrophic or extreme weather events pose a danger not only to expensive military
assets like aircraft and ships, but also to servicemen and servicewomen.
The prospect of these convergent scenarios demands that military planners begin
to incorporate measures to respond to climate change disaster into their worldwide
strategy-and operating budgets. To avoid calamity, military leaders must design, ex
ante, blueprints for facing a situation where advance outposts have been destroyed and
troops are scattered around the globe. This advance planning can be exercised both in
the renovation of existing bases and in the construction of new bases: "[p]lanning and
action can make these installations more resilient. Lack of planning can compromise
them or cause them to be inundated, compromising military readiness and capability."53
For those facilities already constructed, this process would involve either the fortification of existing infrastructure in an attempt to "climate-proof" the buildings, supporting
power supplies, and routes of access-or a reinstallation of the infrastructure further
from the coast. For new facilities designed to replace bases like Diego Garcia, considered
to be fatally susceptible to the effects of climate change, this would be a very drawnout operation. It would require long-term forecasting of likely weather effects on areas
around the globe, and could involve coordination with foreign nations if proposed bases
impinge on their sovereign territory.54 The construction of military bases-or even the
negotiations surrounding such planned construction-could potentially upset delicate
balances in international politics, driving states away from symbiotic relationships and
toward the brink of conflict. From this brief discussion, one can observe that any longterm strategy to cope with the dangers from climate disaster carries with it many potential peripheral snares. The response of nations to the threats to their military facilities
posed by climate change will therefore playa very important role in the evolution of
international relations during the upcoming century.

The Arctic-A'Special Case
Emerging Security Issues
The once impassable Arctic Ocean seaways are opening up to maritime traffic. Rising
global temperatures have led to a reduction of ice surface in the Arctic Ocean. 55 The
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trend in warming temperatures is expected to continue, leading to more and more seasonal losses of ice cover. Scientific estimates vary as to the possibility and timing of an
ice-free Arctic Ocean. Some predict ice-free waters as early as summer 2013, while others postpone this occurrence until 2030. 56 Scientists have noticed that the ice packs melt
earlier in the year, and it takes longer to refreeze, leading some analysts to conclude that
an ice-free Arctic Ocean is no longer a question of ifbut a question of when. 57
Commercial maritime activity has already increased with the loss of the ice. The
once-mythic Northwest Passage, which primarily runs through Canada, has opened
for maritime traffic for the past three years. 58 A bulk container vessel utilized the
Northern Route, primarily bordering Russia, to ship iron ore from Norway to China
in the summer of 2010. 59 Now, shipping companies are eyeing the Arctic Ocean for
possible shipping lanes. 6o In fact, commercial maritime activity in the Arctic Ocean
seaways increased fivefold in summer 2011. 61
The increase in commercial activity has led to a host of complex international
problems. In the past, the thick ice sheets and the impassability of the now-open sea
lanes negated the need to delineate control of the region. Now that commercial vessels can enter these sea lanes, warships cannot be far behind. Lee Willett, the head of
the maritime studies program at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based
military think tank, stated that warships will enter the Arctic Ocean in order to defend
claims on natural resources in the area: "Having lots of warships, from lots of nations
who have lots of competing claims on territory-that may lend itself to a rather tense
situation."62 The increase in all kinds of shipping and the newfound access to a plethora of natural resources present a host of international issues in an area where historically there has not been much control.
Governments are just beginning to evaluate the nature of the difficulties posed by
a navigable Arctic region and to account for them in future strategic outlooks. The
situation creates a whole host of complex international problems because the presence of the thick ice sheets previously negated the need to delineate, specifically, which
territory was under whose control. The issues related to territorial possession will
determine which nations reap the rewards from increased access to shipping, including all tangential associated benefits of such control; just as importantly, these issues
will determine which nations can search for, harvest, and exploit the vast resources in
the Arctic Sea itself and underneath the expansive seabed. At present, there are more
questions than answers for how these issues will play out in the near future. This
chapter therefore serves to identify the most likely problems that will arise and to
identify those mechanisms-already in existence or capable of future adoption-that
can allow positive international cooperation in the region and prevent armed conflict.
As mentioned above, the melting Arctic ice shelf will open up two shipping routes
that have previously been closed off because, even with the advent of modern seabased icebreakers, the density of the packed ice rendered maneuvering the waters
either exceedingly dangerous or downright impossible. The so-called "Northwest Passage" runs primarily along the Canadian border and is the path through the Western
Hemisphere that would unite the eastern seaboard of North America with East Asia
and the Pacific Ocean. In the Eastern Hemisphere, the "Northern Route" meanders
along the Russian border and brings together East Asia and Western Europe, providing entry into the Atlantic Ocean. Access to either of these routes would greatly reduce
the length of sea-based trips from Europe to the Pacific (by avoiding the Suez Canal)
and from Europe to the Pacific (by avoiding the Panama Canal). Moreover, the Arctic
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routes are in close geographic proximity to some of the world's largest economies,
each heavily dependent on foreign trade; this list includes the United States, Russia,
China, the European Union, Canada, and Japan. These nations would presumably
find great advantages in using these sea-based travel lanes for importing and exporting goods. In addition to shortening the length of time-providing significant energy
and cost savings-these routes allow trading nations to avoid those areas, especially
in the Middle East and off the Horn of Africa, that in recent times have been plagued
by terrorist activity and rogue pirate outfits. In sum, the presence of Arctic sea lanes
could steer the world into a new phase of globalization: if developed fully, global trade
patterns could be completely and irrevocably altered. 63
The melting of the Arctic Ocean sea lanes would not only aid commercial shipping
but would also open up the area for the harvesting of natural resources. "Although
the precise extent of the region's undiscovered oil and natural gas reserves and various minerals has not been determined, indications are that it is massive."64 The race
to claim these resources could lead to international problems in an area where there
has not been much control. For example, in 2007 Russia sent a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two deep-water submarines to plant a Russian flag in the seabed beneath
the North Pole. Canada is constructing several new Arctic patrol vessels, a deep-water
port, and a training facility in the Northwest Passage. Several other countries, notably
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, have also made claims on the natural resources of the area. 65
Currently, there are few international binding rules that govern the Arctic region.
Historically, the thick ice made rules unnecessary, as the region was accessible only
to explorers and adventure-seekers. The presence of commercial vessels and the possible exploitation of natural resources present a potentially tense situation. The areas
most under contention are the high seas and the various nations' continental shelves.
There is an international organization devoted to resolving Arctic issues-the Arctic
Council. Ostensibly, one of the goals of the Council is to promote the responsible use
of Arctic natural resources, but it remains to be seen, as discussed below, how effective
the Council will be in resolving the myriad of complex issues presented by the loss of
the Arctic ice.
Several nations have already stated an "interest" in the Arctic. The industrial
nations of China, South Korea, Japan, Iceland, Norway, and Russia, as well as the
European Union, have declared interests in the development of the region. Developing
nations, too, like Brazil, India, and South Africa, have also declared an interest in the
region. Several of these nations do not border the Arctic Ocean.
One potential solution for resolving Arctic claims issues is to restrict access to the
region, but doing so would necessarily defy the general right of free navigation on the
seas. There are several methods by which nations could control and/or restrict access
to the Arctic. One method would be to charge tolls to enter the area. Of course, that
would involve a determination of which nations or international bodies should be
the controlling entities. Another method would be to blockade the Arctic sea lanes.
Finally, there could be restricted access based on ship performance and standards.
Maritime classification societies already classify some vessels as capable of operating
in icy waters. Thus, it would be a fairly easy process to restrict access to only those
vessels capable of operating in those waters.
Of course, these methods all seem to impede the free navigation of the seas, a right
granted by the Law of the Sea Convention. 66 Would there be remedies available for
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unfair blockage of the Arctic Ocean? The Convention grants authority to an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. What role would this court play in settling the
disputes concerning the Arctic Ocean? Will the United States, which is not currently a
signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention, play any role in this resolution?
Should access to the Arctic Ocean be restricted based on some criteria, would
humanitarian aid vessels be allowed passage, regardless of flag state? One would
expect an exception for aid vessels in providing humanitarian relief to disaster areas.
But what if the controlling entity of the Arctic Ocean does not provide for such an
exception? Would there be any resolution of this potentially thorny issue? The United
States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps both provide humanitarian relief
efforts around the globe. The National Research Council concluded that hospital
ships for humanitarian relief efforts may be in higher demand as the Arctic ice recedes.
With the opening of the Arctic sea lanes, it may become faster and easier to send relief
efforts, thus leading to a higher demand for United States humanitarian aid. 67
If access to the Arctic Ocean is restricted, what entity will enforce the restrictions?
The United Nations? NATO? The Arctic Council? A coalition of controlling nations?
How effective would the restrictions and the enforcement be?
Of all of the nations with a declared "interest" in the Arctic, Russia's role presents some of the most challenging questions. Former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
called for international cooperation and environmental protection in the Arctic. 68 Yet,
Russia has also been the most aggressive in claiming rights in the region for itself. In
addition to planting a Russian flag on the sea floor beneath the North Pole,69 Russia has also claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, supposedly an underwater extension of
Siberia. Analysts determined that Russia's claim on this territory would add 1.2 million square kilometers to its control, as well as an estimated 10 billion metric tons of
hydrocarbons. 70
Russia has also provoked other nations with its Arctic claims, including the United
States, by drafting laws that seem to reflect Russia's Arctic claims. Russia's Foreign
Ministry has claimed that the laws "would apply only to administrative borders inside
Russia, and [are] not connected to its claim for a greater share of the Arctic."71 The
Russian Federation attempted to reassure other nations by stating that they would
work with a UN committee concerning the Arctic claims.72 Nevertheless, the Russian
Navy currently has the largest fleet of icebreakers, and it is currently working on a $7
billion expansion of the port in Murmansk. 73
The Arctic waters are already contested by competing nations. As the ice recedes,
and vessel traffic increases, tensions will only multiply. Russia and Canada have already
traded verbal shots across the bow,?4 The other nations with interests in the region,
notably the United States, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, have also announced plans
_
to beef up their military forces in the region. 75
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention will be critical in resolving these issues, but
the United States is not a party to it, despite recent efforts to· push ratification through
the Senate. 76 The Department of Defense (DoD) supports ratification to the Convention.?? In its review of the effects of climate change on the USN, the National Research
Council determined that remaining outside of the Convention would hinder the USN's
ability to meet the country's goals in the Arctic region. Thus, it, too, recommended
that the United States ratify the Convention. 78
Scientists predict that the natural resource reserves of the Arctic region are
immense. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that some 400 oil and natural gas
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fields north of the Arctic Circle hold as much as 90 billion barrels worth of oil and
1,670 trillion cubic feet of gas,?9 If nations begin to develop the Arctic resources and
utilize the Arctic sea lanes, then what will happen to the Suez Canal and the Middle
East? To what extent will Arctic oil help the United States to escape a dependency on
Middle Eastern oil reserves?
Another potential problem with developing the Arctic region concerns the rights
of indigenous people. The Arctic Council does have provisions for recognizing indigenous populations and allowing their representatives to be permanent participants,80
butas discussed below, they have no voting rights in the Council. It remains to be seen
wheth~r these permanent participants and the Arctic Council can adequately respect
and protect the indigenous peoples and the fragile Arctic environment while other
nations harvest the natural resources of the region.
With so many states declaring an interest in the Arctic and so few rules controlling the region, what environmental laws and policies would govern, in overlapping
jurisdictions? As previously mentioned, the potential oil and natural gas reserves of
the Arctic region are quite large. 81 Countries that border the Arctic clearly have an
interest in claiming these resources and potentially have more of a legitimate claim
than countries that do not border the Arctic. The expansive definition of a coastal
state's continental shelf under the 1982 Convention, where most of these resources
are located, is yet another reason why the United States stands to benefit from ratification. 82 It has been estimated that the United States could claim the continental shelf
under the treaty as far as 600 miles beyond its exclusive economic zone as the ice
cap recedes in the Arctic. 83 In addition to oil and gas, there are also potentially large
quantities of other minerals, including gold, copper, iron ore, cobalt, nickel, diamonds,
and manganese. 84
With the region opening to commercial and military traffic, cruise lines would
probably not be far behind. In fact, Russia is already outfitting some of its icebreakers with accommodations for touristS. 85 What impact will tourism have on the region
and the indigenous population? Nations and private commercial parties would also
be competing for fishing rights in the Arctic. Would this competition deprive the Arctic indigenous peoples of their livelihoods?86 There are also environmental concerns.
How will the influx of warmer water affect the indigenous wildlife? Will southern
marine species come to dominate the Arctic?
Nation-states and private commercial entities seeking to compete for these
resources will be driven to develop the infrastructure to extract the resources of the
region. Oil and natural gas rigs, pipelines, support facilities, and collection facilities
will need to be built. The personnel will need housing; ports will need to be developed
to accommodate this work. The Arctic region may not be able to support all this infrastructure in an environmentally sound manner.
With so much commercial value in the area, nations are likely to send military
vessels into the region to protect their claimsP This would necessitate the deployment
of military technology that can operate in the polar climate. 88 Currently, the United
States is ill-equipped to protect its interests in the region: "[T]he Coast Guard has just
three polar icebreakers in its fleet-the only such vessels in the entire U.S. military."89
Additionally, two of those vessels are over 30 years old, and one of those is currently in caretaker status in Seattle in need of extensive repairs.90 Russia, on the other
hand, has 18 heavy icebreakers, and Canada possesses six. 91 Military tensions have
increased in the region as nations rush to claim the Arctic and defend those claims.92
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States are already engaging in increased military activity in the Arctic region. In
2010, Canada purchased fleets of F-35 jet fighters and began construction of a new
base on its Arctic coast.93 Military activity to control the Arctic will probably revolve
around naval forces, but air support and missile defense systems will also be critical. As previously mentioned, the United States is currently woefully unprepared to
grapple with an increased military role in the Arctic, despite the Obama administration's designation of the region as one of key strategic interest. 94 NATO has already
completed war games in the Arctic to devise military strategies for the region. 95
The increased military activity in the Arctic will affect more than just the countries directly involved. For example, Iceland's former Prime Minister Geir Haarde
pleaded in 2010 with the competing nations to draw down their military presence in
the Arctic: "The end of the Cold War resulted in a marked reduction in military activity in the High North-Iceland would like it to stay that way."96 Clearly, the bordering
nations with claims on the region will be affected by climate change and the race for
resources. Even nations that do not directly border the Arctic will face repercussions
from events in the region.
At a 2009 conference in Iceland to plan for climate change in the Arctic, NATO
released a statement calling for a military presence in the region.97 As then-NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters, "I would be the last one
to expect a military conflict-but there will be a military presence."98 Nations and
military analysts have already recognized that climate change could lead to military
tensions in the region. For example, the United States National Academy of Sciences
has determined that climate change will lead to new challenges for the USN, United
States Coast Guard (USCG), and USMC in the region. 99

If the United States wants to take on an expanded military role in the Arctic, then
the nation's military faces significant challenges. First, if the United States focuses on
the Arctic as an area of strategic interest, as the Obama administration has recommended,l0o then other regions might have to be drawn down. Second, a military role
in the Arctic would require significant spending to develop and construct military
hardware capable of operating in the Arctic, as well as for training troops and building the logistical support for those operations.
The next question would be which branch assumes primary control. The Pentagon has unified Arctic responsibility under one command. 101 In the face of budgetary
shortages, the USCG in 2011 decided to decommission one of its icebreakers in order
to obtain the money to repair another: "'As old as they are, and with what it costs
to maintain and keep them up, we had to make some difficult choices,' said a Coast
Guard spokesman, Lt. Paul Rhynard. 'With the funding we were given to fix them
both, we could only effectively fix one."'102
The United States may already be falling behind in the competition over the:: Arctic. The DoD recognizes that it must work with the Coast Guard and Department
of Homeland Security "to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities
to support both current and future planning and operations."103 The USN probably
does not currently have the capability to operate in the Arctic: "[T]he U.S. Navy has
had a very limited surface ship presence in ... cold-weather conditions ... the U.S.
military as a whole has. lost most of its competence in cold-weather operations for
high-Arctic warfare."104 Military vessels will be needed to defend any claims on the
region. Additionally, military vessels could protect American commercial operations
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and investigatory teams. lOS However, the increased number of military vessels in the
Arctic has the potential to cause more tension, leading to possible conflicts.
In addition to protecting American interests in the Arctic, the military would also
need to be concerned with an expanded role in search-and-rescue and other emergency operations. If the USN and USCG undertake any emergency operations in the
Arctic, they would have to develop specialized search-and-rescue operations designed
for the region. The remote locations, the freezing conditions, and the lack of logistical support make emergency operations in the Arctic uniquely different from routine
operations in warmer waters.
pespite competing claims to the Arctic's natural resources, there is also an awareness of the need to protect the fragile Arctic ecosystem.I0 6 Monitoring and protecting
the environment present many of the same difficulties as determining how to control
access to the region. Who is responsible for monitoring and protecting the Arctic? In
the event of an environmental disaster, such as an oil spill, who will clean it up? In
addition to the allocation of responsibility and costs, there is the added degree of difficulty in cleaning up a disaster in such a remote location.
Utilizing the Arctic sea lanes also presents unique environmental issues. The
shorter Arctic sea passages would reduce greenhouse gas emissions globally, at least
from the shipping sector. The Arctic sea passages are shorter than the Suez or Panama
canals, but they would put more air pollutants (especially black carbon) into the Arctic's air, which may lead to more ice melting. Commercial activity in the region would
also pose environmental risks: "Such increased shipping, mining, and drilling would
almost certainly pose new environmental risks."lo7
As the branches of the United States military begin to plan for the future of the
region, they must consider the potential effects of climate change to ensure that the
military installations of tomorrow are effectively adapted to withstand the associated
risks. The Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review Report called for "a
comprehensive assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate
change on its missions and adapt as required."lo8 As stated in the CNA's report, "planning and action can make these installations more resilient. Lack of planning can
compromise them, or cause them to be inundated, compromising military readiness
and capability."109

International Mechanisms for the Arctic
In view of the challenges just described, a major question concerns the nature and
extent of the role to be played by the Arctic Council. The Ottawa Declaration of 1996
established the Arctic Council. 110 It was created to facilitate the Arctic states' cooperation with each other and with the Arctic inhabitants and indigenous communities. 111
The Council seeks to promote "sustainable development" and "environmental protection in the Arctic,"112 and to control pollution and environmental damage in the
Arctic. l13 Additionally, the Council is committed to maintaining the well-being of the
indigenous people. 114
The council is composed of member states, permanent participants, and observers. llS Member states are states that border the Arctic. 116 Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States are the eight
member states. l17 Permanent participants are Arctic organizations, with primarily
Arctic indigenous constituents, which represent "a single Indigenous people resident
in more than one Arctic State" or "more than one Arctic Indigenous people resident
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in a single Arctic State."118 There are currently six permanent participants: the Aleut
International Association (AlA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council
International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Saami Council, and Russian
Arctic Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON).119 Non-Arctic states, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations can be observers,12o As of June
2012, there were 26 observers.121
The Arctic Council has no legal personality.122 The Council works together to create goals and obligations that will promote. environmental protection and sustainable
development in the Arctic. 123 The obligations, however, are not legally enforceablethey are merely recommendations. 124 The Arctic Council has traditionally been considered without the ability to impose binding legal obligations even upon its member
states and with all recommendations made by consensus of the member states only.125
Each member state chairs the council for two years. 126 After two years, the chairmanship rotates to a new country.127 The chair state determines the goals for its term
and how it would like to achieve them.128 It has appeared to be more difficult to
achieve even the limited goals of the Council because of the rotating chairmanship.129
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden have recognized that problem and have created a
plan together in order to ensure that they have a little over six years, 2006-2013, to
achieve their common goals. 130
The Council holds ministerial meetings biannually.131 The country holding the
chairmanship hosts the Council.132 At the meetings, the Council decides what programs and projects to implement. 133 The eight member states have voting power and
the permanent participants are consultants. 134
The ministerial declarations are given to the Council's working groups,135 which
are responsible for implementing the programs and projects. 136 There are six working
groups,137 each of which has its own board and secretariat. 138 The boards are generally composed of representatives from member states and permanent participants. 139
Working groups hold regular meetings. 14o Experts are frequently invited to attend
and offer advice.141 Observers are also welcome to attend the meetings and participate in projects. 142
The maneuvering for Arctic resources may benefit, among others, Greenland and
Quebec. Stronger financial footing for both may also lead to intensified secession
claims, particularly in Greenland to the dismay of Denmark, which otherwise has no
share in these resources. Two of the eight member states, Canada and the Russian
Federation, have been particularly aggressive in staking their claims, with the Russian
Federation, as noted above, going so far as to plant its flag in the seabed under the
North Pole and patrol the area with bomber planes and warships.143
The May 2011 meeting of the Council resulted in two minor agreements on oil
spills and search-and-rescue operations, more significant for what they represented
than for what they accomplished. The search-and-rescue agreement was the-first
legally binding agreement negotiated within the Council. The agreements suggest that
the Council has recognized the power it may exercise over one-quarter of the world's
untapped oil and gas reserves, along with other mineral resources, by entering into
the first stages of binding rules and/or agreements. The significance of this step was
marked by the presence of Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton at the May 2011 meeting, the first time a Council meeting was attended by a U.S. secretary of state. 144 Just
as significantly, the efforts of ad-hoc observer states (China, the EU, Italy, Japan, and
South Korea) to become permanent observers were resisted by Russia and indigenous
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groups threatened by the prospect of such powerful non-Arctic states having even a
nonvoting role in the Council. 145
The United States' failure to ratify the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea is a decision that can no longer be overlooked for its consequences for the international community, but even more for the United States. The United States has for many
years recognized the essential provisions of the treaty, including the most basic provisions regarding delineation of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, economic zone, and
high seas. The 1982 treaty increases the security authority of states in some of these
zones, and expands coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The United
States, disproportionately with respect to most states, benefits from these provisions.
As a nonparty the United States is precluded from representation on the international
bodies created by the nearly universally adopted treaty. The Obama administration,
and for some time the Department of Defense, have supported ratification of the
treaty. The "sea change," as it were, in support for ratification is that its traditional
opponents are now urging ratification in response to the Arctic crisis. On June 21,
2011, at a symposium on the impacts of an ice-diminishing Arctic on naval and maritime operations, both the Republican and Democrat senators from Alaska called for
immediate ratification of the treaty.146 In the opinion of this author, it is critical that
the United States ratify the treaty, and playa proactive, high-level role in the previously ignored Arctic Council.

International Mechanisms, Climate Change,
and National Security
On a more general normative level, in the author's view, the refusal of the United
Nations to recognize the responsibility to protect, as applicable to climate change
humanitarian crises, is a blindness to the environmental realities. In a January 2009
report on the responsibility to protect, the United Nations secretary-general specifically excluded the norm from applying to climate change or the response to natural
disasters. 147 The responsibility to protect is an innovative and necessary paradigmshifting norm or "quasi-norm" of international law. Existing international law already
can be interpreted to encompass some natural disasters, environmental destruction,
and imminent environmental crises within the four atrocity crimes. 148 If, however,
in order to preserve this advance in international law it is necessary, on a practical
and diplomatic level, to pretend that its applicability to environmental disasters does
not exist, then that approach is preferable to di.ssent and abandonment of a norm
whose time has inevitably come. The unavoidable role of the United Nations Security
Council in humanitarian missions must be seriously reevaluated in the context of
adaptation to climate disruption. On April 17, 2007, the UN Security Council debated
whether the potential for global warming to cause wars brought it within the Security
Council's authority over international peace and security.149 For some time now there
has been discussion of a global emergency response force for environmental disasters.
Expertise and resources, and a legal framework, are needed for the Security Council
to lead in establishing a humanitarian rapid deployment force to address the next
tsunami, the next Chernobyl, or similar environmental disasters in distressed states,
with or without state consent. 150 The norm that states have a responsibility to protect
civilian populations when their own state is unwilling or unable to do so has been
limited to narrowly defined instances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
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crimes against humanity. Whatever remaining debate there might be as to whether
the cataclysmic weather events mayor may not be attributable to climate change, it
is indisputable that even highly developed states, such as Japan, turn to the United
States for assistance in times of crisis. In terms of the rapidly recognized legal norm
of the responsibility to protect, its purported exclusion of environmental emergencies
ignores both the legal parameters of the norm as well as the practical realities of the
responsibility to protect.
Based on the October 28, 2011, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change
Adaptation Task Force, much of the United States' support of international adaptation
to ensure stability will proceed with foreign aid and cooperative ventures. 151 Adaptation is one of the three pillars of the Global Climate Change Initiative of the September
2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development. As part of the Global Initiative, the State Department, the U.S.- Agency for International Development, and the
Treasury Department have provided resources for programs to support other countries
and communities in adaptation strategies. Other federal agencies, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, are
also incorporating climate change considerations into their programs; The multilateral
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience has leveraged $285 million to assist vulnerable
developing countries to incorporate climate resilience into their development policies
and planning. NASA and the U.S. AID's joint venture SERVIR program has provided
environmental information to support adaptation in developing countries in Central
America, the Caribbean, East Africa, and the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region of South
Asia. The State Department, USAID, NOAA, and EPA are assisting the global Adaptation Partnership of more than 20 developed and developing countries in identifying
adaptation priorities, improving coordination, and increasing financing of adaptation
measures. The National Security Staff convened technical, international development,
intelligence, and defense agencies to examine the relevance of climate change to development, diplomacy, and defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Mullen, released the 2010 National Military Strategy, which (1) notes the importance
of climate change to the future security environment; (2) discusses conflict prevention in detail; and (3) emphasizes the savings from preventive action. Combatant commanders are also authorized to consider climate risks in theater campaign plans and
cooperate with foreign militaries on environmentally related matters. 152

Conclusion
There is a misperception that climate change poses a gradually mounting threat to
national and international security. A more accurate description of the environmental
risk is climate disruption, which involves sporadic episodes of severe environmental
destruction in the context of worsening environmental degradation and disruption on
a more generalized scale, endangering economic, national, international, and human
security. This reality poses different types of threats to security: immediate nece~si
ties for humanitarian assistance; gradual destabilization of states and regions and
adjustment of military resources to deal with these situations; the physical threat to
military bases, infrastructure, and personnel; and destabilization of physical boundaries and established coalitions. Each of these scenarios necessitates very different adaptive responses. With respect to immediate humanitarian assistance and more gradual
destabilization, there is a necessity for innovative military planning for emergency
response and more long-term military commitments. Despite the United Nations'
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refusal to recognize the responsibility to protect as applicable to climate change consequences, refusal to recognize climate change as a trigger of the responsibility to protect civilian populations ignores the realities of environmental disasters as equivalent
in harm to serious human rights violations.153 All of these scenarios mandate reallocation of increasingly strained resources and a global reformulation of legal norms and
resource priorities, particularly for the most developed (and thereby morally, if not
legally, obligated-to-respond) states.
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